

## EXHIBIT NO. 8-C

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (4 Dec 45)GB

4 DECEMBER 1945.

Subject: Additional Data With Reference To Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.  
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. (Attention Assistants  
Chief of Staff, G-2)

1. Reference previous correspondence same file number and subject and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec., 7 October 1945, and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, an additional partial report is forwarded herewith.

2. This report contains data in amplification of the original Japanese answer to question 14 of our questionnaire of 17 October 1945. A copy of this questionnaire was forwarded as Inclosure No. 4 to our communication of 26 October 1945, and the original Japanese answer to question 14 thereof was included in inclosure to our communication of 8 November 1945.

3. This report completes the series of partial reports obtained through the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Japanese Army and Navy, which series collectively provide all data available from known Japanese sources on subjects listed in your radio WX 73711, War Sec., 7 October 1945. However, should additional data come to light incident to future investigations of Japanese conduct of the war, same will be promptly forwarded.

For the Supreme Commander:

/S/ E. D. Law, Jr.  
E. D. Law, Jr.  
Major, AGD,  
Asst. Adj. Gen.

1 Incl: Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire.

[1] 3543 B  
N. D. 406

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

NOTE: Translation requested by Colonel MUNSON, G-2.

17 NOVEMBER 1945.

To: Colonel F. P. MUNSON

From: Rear Admiral NAKAMURA

*Answers with reference to a letter to Rear Admiral Nakamura from Colonel Munson dated 10 November 1945*

1. In the report sent by the HONOLULU consul-general to the Foreign Ministry, anything concerning the Navy was reported to the Intelligence Section of the Naval General Staff by that Ministry. These reports, it is recollected, were gradually increased in number as the relations between AMERICA and JAPAN became more tense.

The above reports by the consul-general were chiefly items concerning the general political and economic situation in HAWAII and the UNITED STATES as seen from HAWAII, items concerning the Japanese living in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, and partly items concerning military matters. Thus, although there were things going on in HAWAII, as was reported at that time such as concentration of American fleet units in the PEARL HARBOR area and the considerable hastening of expansion of military installations in the HAWAIIAN area, to which great attention was attracted as compared with reports by diplomatic establishments located in other areas, it is recalled that there was nothing which required special surveillance as far as the data for an attack on the UNITED STATES fleet in HAWAII were concerned.

(Since the staff officer connected with the documents reporting the above facts has died and the various records have been burned, the foregoing is the conjecture of commander TACHIBANA, Tomo who worked in the same department at that time.)

The Intelligence Section of the Naval General Staff was having a most [2] difficult time judging the habits, strength, and security situations of the Ameri-

can fleet in the HAWAIIAN area. Owing to this, the Intelligence Section of the Naval General Staff had been for years compiling material by carefully collecting, making into statistics, and analyzing bits of information obtained from Naval officers at WASHINGTON, newspapers and magazines published in AMERICA, American radio broadcasts, signal intelligence, passengers and crews of ships stopping over at HONOLULU, other foreign diplomatic establishments, commercial firms, and the like.

The foregoing statistical method of estimation had been in use for a considerable length of time. Publications with information on important moorings within PEARL HARBOR had already been compiled.

Furthermore, if we were to go into the facts mentioned above more minutely, and if two or three examples which made a relatively strong impression were given, they would appear as follows:

A. American radio broadcasts 5 December 1941 (or 6 December 1941) (American time).

The UNITED STATES broadcast of the number of battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and others entering (or anchored) in PEARL HARBOR was overheard.

B. Signal intelligence.

According to the signals of the American ships, the number of ships and small craft of the UNITED STATES fleet anchored in PEARL HARBOR or out on training was deduced. Again by combining the flying time (judged according to signal situations) of airplanes shuttling between bases and aircraft carriers out on training missions, and the location of UNITED STATES fleet units as seen by passengers and crews of ships stopping over at HONOLULU, the training areas of the UNITED STATES fleet were determined. The zone, time, etc., of airplane patrols at HAWAII were deduced in the same way.

C. Newspapers and magazines published in the UNITED STATES

Material was obtained for deduction of AMERICA'S war preparation, progress and expansion of military installations, location and capabilities of warships and airplanes, army strength at HAWAII, PANAMA, PHILIPPINES and other places, etc.

D. Observation submarines

With an observation submarine operating at a lessening distance outside the Islands, the sphere of observation of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS was gradually made smaller (It reached outside of PEARL HARBOR on 6 December—American time). Thus, the ships out at sea, ships at LAHAINA, the airplane patrols, etc., were ascertained.

The above submarine, while out at sea, did not discover an American fleet at sea or at LAHAINA, but met aircraft carriers and patrol planes.

II. The gist of ". . . and other general intelligence" contained in the last items of the answer with reference to question No. 14, dated 17 October, was the reports for foreign diplomatic establishments, commercial firms in [3] foreign countries, etc., to the Foreign Ministry, the main store of the commercial firm, etc., chiefly on the general political and economic situation (some military matters included) of the country where the establishment or firm was located. These reports were not important enough from the standpoint of intelligence to have a special write-up, and were considered on their own merits.

## EXHIBIT NO. 8-D

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 250:05 (15 Dec 45) BG

15 DECEMBER 1945

Subject: Additional Data With Reference To Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor  
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.

(Attention: A. C. of S., G-2.)

1. Reference Par 3 of our communication, same file number and subject dated 4 December 1945, and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec., 7 October 1945 and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl